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Waiting for God:
A Hasidic View
N O R M A N K. S W A Z 0
"...in all letters, sacred and profane, the topic of human misery has been insisted on with the most pathetic eloquence that sorrow and melancholy could
inspire."
-Philo, Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion (Hume)

I
Every philosopher and theologian, at least in the Western tradition of that discourse, has been exposed to the arguments concerning the existence and nature of God. S/he has been exposed
to those foundational arguments also with reference to what they
entail for our evaluation of human experience, and what we may
conclude about the nature of God from that experience.
Ontological and cosmological arguments as well as the argument
from design have remained the focus of protracted disputation,
generally with reference to the tension between those of empiricist and rationalist comportment, or with reference to that instruction given by Kant which places us beyond any reconciliation of
that tension as we seem compelled to concede before an insuperable antinomy of reason. The distinction of "postulate" of pure
reason and "demonstration" comes sharply to the fore as we consider what we can "think" and "hope" but cannot "know." In the
aftermath of that discovery of finitude to human knowledge, philosophy and theology suffered from the Nietzschean subversion
of Platonism and Christianity. Both disciplines continue to experience — and continue to come to some settled existence amidst
— the aftershocks of "the death of God" and the indictment of the
narrative of that history as one of "error," indeed as one of
"fable."
If we are compelled by the Nietzschean critique of the metaphysical foundations of Western history, then we also abandon the
traditional formulations of the problem of evil in what that formula says concerning both the existence and the nature of God.
But, suppose one is compelled to think otherwise, as well one
may. One may be moved, after all, to suspect and then find in that
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critique yet another circumscribed locution, to wit: 'I, Nietzsche,
am the truth.' In this m o m e n t of thinking otherwise, one may then
see disclosed an opportunity to engage again the problem of evil
in its traditional formulation, though now to be engaged in an
awareness of a philosophy and theology stumbling about and
seeking their way beyond the "eyfelspell" cast in the last century.
At a time in which the metaphysics of presence yields before the
post-metaphysical thinking of difference, of disclosure and concealment/withdrawal, we recall not only the Heraclitean dictum
that "Being loves to hide"(cp\)ai<; K p m x e a G a i <|>itei), but also
that — as it were — God hides.
Thus, it is as if the discourse on the death of God points to a
problem Western humanity has been unable either to understand
or to accept, viz., that of a deus absconditus.
Does not Nietzsche
tacitly, or even in his oblique irony, point to this in the laughing,
yet essentially serious, question those in the marketplace ask "the
m a d m a n " who announces that he seeks G o d ? "Why...is he hiding?" they ask. The laughter which the m a d m a n ' s question occasions is a mask for an unspoken, even repressed, agony, that
agony which can see no way to reconciliation, to atonement, with
a deus absconditus:
One cannot — one refuses to — believe in
a God who hides. Or, if one grants that God exists, then one cannot but speak of such a hidden God as malevolent or impotent: If
God is omniscient, so the argument goes in all its pathos, then He
must know of the evil in our world. Further, if God is omnipotent,
then He must be able to remove the evil that is in the world.
Moreover, if God is omnibenevolent, then He must desire the
removal of this evil. But, alas, God does not remove the evil that
is in the world. The presence of evil in the world is evidence that
God does not exist or that God is either malevolent or impotent. 1
Alas... — in that one word is concentrated the pathos of despair
and agony, even rage against the cold sting of abandonment.
Laughter, even an uneasy laughter such as that found in the marketplace, is preferable to an otherwise inviolate silence.
II
It has been remarked often enough since the middle of the
century that ours is a "post-Christian culture," a culture for which
God is dead. 2 Ours is a time of "No-saying." Yet, it has been
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noted that "The great No-sayers are those who have suffered most
profoundly." 3 T.J.J. Altizer rightly noted that "Few, if any,
thinkers have known the sheer
horror of existence which
Nietzsche unveiled. Casting aside every fixed source of meaning
and value, Nietzsche passed through an interior dissolution of an
established form of consciousness and selfhood and resurrected a
chaos of meaninglessness lying deeply buried within the psyche
of Western man." 4 Indeed, Nietzsche's "No-saying" to the narrative of Western history, to its central idea and reality of the transcendent God, bespeaks a profound suffering, viz., his own suffering.. "Why atheism today?" asks Nietzsche, '"the father' in
God has been thoroughly refuted; ditto, 'the j u d g e ' , 'the
rewarder'. Also his 'free will': he does not hear — and if he
heard he still would not know how to help. Worst of all: he seems
incapable of clear communication; is he unclear?" 5
Thus,
Nietzsche's Fursprache is the veil of a pathetic eloquence. God
does not hear; God does not reward; God does not manifest his
justice; God is deficient in that knowledge with which he might
help the suffering human being; God is silent; God does not
"father" either as one expects or as one hopes. Thus, one has no
choice but to sacrifice God himself — "sacrifice for once whatever is comforting, holy, healing; all hope, all faith in hidden harmony, in future blisses and justices." 6
Notwithstanding his sacrifice of God, Nietzsche's is a suffering which would liberate itself from vengeance, even as the
ressentiment of this suffering steeps the individual into a madness
within which s/he may seek God while confessing his/her guilt.
Contra Nietzsche, but for Nietzsche, we need not be the advocates of Zarathustra's Yes-saying, in whose "radically profane
vision" apxr) and te^ot;, A and Q, are abandoned for the doctrine of eternal recurrence. From the beginning of his inquiry and
onward to the end of his power to inquire, Nietzsche sought both
demonstration and consolation: "Faith," he said, "does not offer
the least support for a proof of objective truth...if you wish to be
a devotee of truth, then inquire..." 7 It is in inquiry that one
demonstrates one's virtue; and in Nietzsche it is this virtue which
becomes for him both addiction and catastrophe: "I love him who
loves his virtue, for virtue is the will to go under and an arrow of
longing...I love him who makes his virtue his addiction and his
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catastrophe: for his virtue's sake he wants to live on and to live no
longer." 8 The signature of Nietzsche's unforfeited search for the
deus absconditus, the signature of his "deep want" for eternity, is
the madness into which both thinker and man are driven. It is in
this surrender to the claim of madness that Nietzsche preserves
the possibility which human reason and human experience cannot
but deny in the absence of "demonstration" and "consolation."
Camus, in his essential connection to the word of Nietzsche,
in his pain before an absurd existence, was correct (and remains
correct) in his statement that the problem of evil and human suffering is ever "the insurmountable barrier" to belief in the God of
Christianity. The "desperate formulation" of the question, asked
by orthodox theologian, philosopher, and layman alike, remains:
"how can God, who is the source of the good, wear the mask of
evil? Why has God hidden himself behind the 'screen' of creation, so that we can love him only in the form of the 'inconsolable bitterness' of his absence?" 9 The usual evasive answers to
"the mystery of iniquity" will no longer do, i.e., to say (a) that we
must "shy away from questions about suffering on the grounds
that we have no right to put impious questions to the holy God";
(b) that evil is ontologically impossible; (c) that " w e are not asked
to understand, but only to fight evil"; (d) that "God is the source
of all, good and evil alike, and this is what it means to affirm the
divinity of God, and if we don't like it we don't need to affirm
him." 10 These answers have always been evasions and, so, have
never satisfied either the pious or the infidel, each of whom is at
one time or another incredulous before the scandal of iniquity. In
our day, especially after that human yet inhuman experience
which is identified by the name Auschwitz, it is not Elijah but the
prophets of Baal who stand to win the hearts of those who experience a radical doubt but have deep want of eternity."
Not only will the evasive answers of the past not do. We also
cannot accept readily the more contemporary answer of "lordship
as humiliation"; in which the suffering Jesus transforms our conception of divinity: "it is God withdrawing from all claims to
power and authority and sovereignty." 12 Neither can we accept
the different but related contemporary answer which concludes
that "there can no longer be either a truly contemporary movement to transcendence or an active living faith in the transcendent
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God," on the grounds that "the movement of the Incarnation has
now become manifest in every human mind and face, dissolving
even the memory of God's original transcendent life and redemptive power." 13
In the experience of Auschwitz, and especially after
Auschwitz, many feel compelled to entreat the transcendent God,
articulating the fear of radical doubt that arises in an "inconsolable bitterness": "Make haste, you must save the children of
Israel, they cannot hold out any longer. If you do not save them
as Jews, you will have to redeem them as pagans!" 14 That a Jew
should become a pagan, that this human being, chosen by God,
who was once a believer should have to be redeemed as pagan —
this is one possible outcome of the Jew standing before a silent
God. Here one must consider what it means for both Jew and
Christian to become pagan, and to become pagan after the scandalous iniquity of Auschwitz. For, the God who is said to have
died at Auschwitz is the God of Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob, and
so the God of both Jew and Christian. Both Jew and Christian
have had to suffer the long silence of their hidden God, and
together they are bound by the same anguished question: "Master
of the Universe, how do you permit such a thing to happen?" 15
Thus they speak to the hidden God... — and still God does not
answer. The question remains without answer, suspended as if in
an infinite void. Alas...
Elohi! Elohi! L'mah sh'vaktani? 16 This is ever the first and
final utterance of the believer. It is spoken by the human being at
the uttermost moment of proximity to death, even as Jesus cried
out thus from the cross. This final utterance of Jesus speaks
prophetically those words which were to be spoken by Western
humanity in that moment of profound suffering in which he experiences the death of God; that moment in which he can anticipate
his own death, the death of the human spirit. Truly to experience
the death of God is to see oneself at the door which is death, thus
to see life from the vantage point of death, and thus to seek meaning for a life lived always in the unexplained presence of iniquity. It is at this point, however, that the silent God can be heard in
the word spoken in allegory. There is a story told in the Talmud
of a king who had a son who had gone astray. "Return to me," the
king said to his son. "I cannot," replied the son, "for I have gone
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too far." "Return as far as you can," said the king to his son, "and
I will come the rest of the way."
Ill
Western humanity, even "Christianized" Western humanity,
has gone astray. Western humanity is defined, characterized, and
identified first and foremost by his essential quest to know — and
to know with a demand that is satisfied ultimately with nothing
less than apodictic certainty. In this quest Western humanity manifests the essential concern of its word, its thought, and its deed,
viz., the human mind. And, in the entirety of its essential history
it is this " m i n d " which is developed to that extreme point of a
rationality in which all things natural, all things artificial, and all
things human are given over and subjected to a cold, calculating,
and impersonal governance. Simone Weil understood this in
speaking of contemporary humanity according to "the model of
the slave" rather than in terms of the hero or the martyr:
The slave emerges as the model of affliction in a technological society
whose blind mechanism makes both heroism and martyrdom meaningless as human possibilities...By a law of compensation, suffering is necessarily converted into either violence or hatred.17

Significantly, however, for Weil "the dark night of G o d ' s
absence is itself the soul's contact with God": "to suffer evil, is
our contact with God." With this one may agree. Yet, one need
not accept Weil's conclusion: "we have to believe in a God who
is like the true God in everything except that he does not exist."'"
We need not conclude also that God is impotent in the face of evil.
Steeped in silence the human being must, indeed, seek from within herself the answers to her questions. In that silence she cannot
but confront her deepest affliction. Insofar as she would "know
herself," in that quest answering to an admonition given in a time
antiquitous, she cannot but know herself in and through that
affliction. It is in the deepest, most critical moment of her affliction that she will be confronted with two alternatives: that of
rebellion pouring forth its agonized rage and enraged agony, or a
liberation which attains to a settled peace in the preserve of that
silence which refuses to answer. It may well be, as Elie Wiesel
put it, that "At the end of every experience, including suffering,
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there is gratitude. What is man? A cry of gratitude." 19
Of course, it is not "mere faith" that the Western mind wants.
It seeks understanding, and even that as a condition sine qua non.
Such understanding requires of itself either an immediate intuition or a demonstration having apodictic certainty. Even a wager
(e.g., that of Pascal) is unacceptable. It is this mind which especially experiences the tremble of radical doubt, since faith alone
is ever insufficient. The Western mind must have its " p r o o f ' of
God's existence, and with equally efficacious rationality speak
without contradiction about the nature of that God. To be confronted with the death of God is, for the Western mind (as
Nietzsche understood), to experience the absence of ground and,
so, to tumble directionless through a dark, cold, and silent universe: No xe/^oq, no e o ^ a x o v , all tumbling motion without rest,
no final Shabbos with God. In this tremble of doubt this Western
mind knows the terror of a corollary: "man's rationality is unable
finally to comprehend his own actual existence." 20
IV
Can we today, we who live after Nietzsche, provide an altogether novel insight into the problem of evil without speaking in
either cavil or sophism, such as Hume's skepticism would require
of any theist? If we cannot, then we seem compelled to assent to
the assertion of Cleanthes that "the only method of supporting
divine benevolence...is to deny absolutely the misery and wickedness of man," or, alternatively, "we must forever find it impossible to reconcile any mixture of evil in the universe with infinite
attributes." 21 These alternatives are the alternatives of self-deception and resignation before the inviolate silence.
The former alternative denies human experience even at the
"origin" (as spoken of by the sacred texts). The human being, at
the origin, chose "knowledge" of good and evil, and so condemned him/herself to "know" and to experience, even to endure,
the good and the evil in nature, as well as the good and evil which
s/he her/himself would disclose inevitably in word, in thought,
and in deed. The human being, prompted by the Satan, would
become as God, knowing good and evil. '"Where the tree of
knowledge stands, there is always Paradise': thus speak the oldest and youngest serpents." 22 In taking up that belief, that "per-
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spective," the human being took his first step away f r o m God, and
a step in the direction of "perspective" and away from "truth":
" T h e devil has the broadest perspectives for God; therefore he
keeps so far away from God — the devil being the most ancient
friend of wisdom." 2 3 So far would the human being stray that s/he
would come to know "the scandal of human existence" even at
the extreme point of confessing that word, that thought, and that
deed, the magnitude of which could not but overwhelm him.
Unable to endure the deus absconditus, Western humanity would
conceive that deed beyond which no greater deed could be conceived: man would murder God. In his confession of guilt for
such an incomparable deed Western humanity nevertheless
retains his affection for the murdered God: The murderer speaks
both his lamentation and his eulogy in his requiem aeternum deo.
Thereafter, self-deception relinquishes the possibility of atonement. Resignation before the inviolate silence — therein is the
only "rest" the human being can have. Henceforth life is to be
lived "joyfully" — let us not talk of our "life-enhancing fictions"....
Therein is the Nietzschean resolution of the problem of evil.
But, inasmuch as it can be assented to only through the deployment of a cohort of life-enhancing fictions, nothing really is
resolved. So, we must think again, contra Nietzsche but for
Nietzsche (and hopefully in such a way that we do not "transgress
grievously" against his pride).
The "solution" to the problem of evil which I wish to advance
here is indebted to the inspiring and always thought-provoking
historical fiction of Chaim Potok, specifically his well-known
novel, The Chosen.2* In this work we are introduced to Daniel
Saunders, son of Reb Saunders, the latter a Hasidic rabbi and a
father who is "more than rabbi," a man who in the eyes of his followers is a tzaddik, a "righteous one," and thus "a bridge between
his followers and God." The same destiny is expected of Daniel,
insofar as he would inherit the dynasty after his father.
Daniel is himself a " p h e n o m e n o n " of mental ability. His
mind seeks to know more than what the Torah and Talmud together make available to him, so great is his "hunger for knowledge."
Secular works (literature, psychology) provide Daniel a certain
excitement not to be found in the Torah and Talmud, the latter get-

https://scholarsarchive.byu.edu/ccr/vol38/iss38/4

8

Swazo: Waiting for God: A Hasidic View

20

COMPARATIVE

CIVILIZATIONS

REVIEW

ting "a little boring after a while." Daniel believes in God; he
believes that man was created by God and that Jews have a mission in life, which is to obey God.
Notwithstanding,
"Sometimes," he remarks at one point, "I'm not sure I know what
God wants, though." 25 So he speaks to his friend Reuven as he
looks out from a window at the people scurrying about on the
street below: "Look at all those people," he says. "They look like
ants. Sometimes I get the feeling that's all we are — ants."
Indeed...what is man, and what does God want of him?
Daniel is brought up by his father in silence — "They never
talk...except when they study Talmud." Daniel does not understand his father's silence, and he does not hate his father for maintaining that silence, such is his respect and trust in his father's
righteous will. Only in the final pages of the novel do we come
to understand, as does Daniel, the wisdom according to which
Daniel is raised in silence. Speaking from the treasure of his tradition, Reb Saunders understands what Western humanity does
not:
A man is born into this world with only a tiny spark of goodness in him.
The spark is God, it is the soul; the rest is ugliness and evil, a shell. The
spark must be guarded like a treasure, it must be nurtured, it must be
fanned into flame. It must learn to seek out other sparks, it must dominate
the shell. Anything can be a shell...Anything. Indifference, laziness, brutality, and genius. Yes, even a great mind can be a shell and choke the
spark.26

Even a great mind can be a shell and choke the spark of goodness. Western humanity exemplifies a hunger for knowledge so
great, that it never leaves him in peace. Like Maimon, of whom
Reb Saunders speaks, Western humanity's experience is a life of
constant wandering, a life never satisfied, "never finding roots
anywhere," and certainly not rooted in the word of God given in
the Torah. What kind of mind does Western humanity disclose in
our century? Reb Saunders spoke of his brother's mind thus: "It
was a cold mind, Reuven, almost cruel, untouched by his soul. It
was proud, haughty, impatient with less brilliant minds, grasping
in its search for knowledge the way a conqueror grasps for power.
It could not understand pain, it was indifferent to and impatient
with suffering." 27 Such is a judicious characterization of Western
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humanity in essential history, in the manifest rationality of this
history. At the end of this history, the search for knowledge transmogrifies itself into a conqueror's grasp for power. Hence is our
day characterized essentially by the proposition that "knowledge
is power," that (as Lord H.B. Acton put it) power corrupts, and
absolute power corrupts absolutely. In this experience of absolute
power one finds ready evidence of a mind untouched by the soul.
Auschwitz is the singular experience in this century of the
madness which human reason can engender. In this experience of
madness a Jew can easily see fit no longer to wait for God, for the
Messiah. Such are the David M a k e r s who, as orthodox Jews in
contrast to a Hasidic Jew such as Reb Saunders, advance the
cause of religious Zionism, not satisfied with the Hasidic declaration that we must "accept G o d ' s will": "We cannot wait for God.
If there is an answer, we must make it ourselves...Six million of
our people have been slaughtered...It is inconceivable. It will
have meaning only if we give it meaning. We cannot wait for
God." 2 " It is Malter who, perhaps, expresses Potok's position on
the question of meaning in human life in the face of suffering evil:
Human beings do not live forever, Reuven. We live less than the time it
takes to blink an eye, if we measure our lives against eternity. So it may be
asked what value is there to a human life. There is so much pain in the
world. What does it mean to have to suffer so much if our lives are nothing more than a blink of an eye?...I learned a long time ago, Reuven, that a
blink of an eye in itself is nothing. But the eye that blinks, that is something. A span of life is nothing. But the man who lives that span, he is
something. He can fill that tiny span with meaning, so its quality is immeasurable though its quantity may be insignificant. Do you understand what
1 am saying? A man must fill his life with meaning, meaning is not automatically given to life.29

The Jewish Zionist cannot wait for God, cannot wait for the
Messiah. But, in the eyes of a Hasidic Jew such as Reb Saunders,
"A secular Jewish state...is a sacrilege, a violation of Torah":
"And where is the Messiah? Tell me, we should forget completely about the Messiah? For this six million of our people were
slaughtered?
That we should forget completely about the
Messiah, that we should forget completely about the Master of the
Universe?...True Jews do not say such a thing!" 30
David Malter and Reb Saunders, two Jews, one orthodox one
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Hasidic, each faced with the pain of the world, each faced with
the silence of God, two different answers, each answer having its
place after Auschwitz. Yes, sometimes, as Daniel said, sometimes
we are not sure we know what God wants. If only God would
speak unequivocally, if only the Master of the Universe would
break the silence he has imposed...
I would like to suggest that it is in the relationship between
Daniel and Reb Saunders that we find a clue to answering our
perennial question and understanding the problem of a deus
absconditus.
Daniel learns what he must learn from the silence
imposed by his father:
You can listen to silence, Reuven. I've begun to realize that you can listen
to silence and learn from it. It has a quality and a dimension all its own.
It talks to me sometimes. I feel myself alive in it. It talks. And I can hear
it...You have to want to listen to it, and then you can hear it. It has a
strange, beautiful texture. It doesn't always talk. Sometimes — sometimes it cries, and you can hear the pain of the world in it. It hurts to listen to it then. But you have to."

Silence, as Reb Saunders knows, is a way of rearing a child.
It was, as Potok informs us, practiced in Europe by some few
Hasidic families. To what end? — to teach a child compassion.
Daniel's experience with silence leads him to hear the silence. To
hear silence is to "feel the burden of the world" upon one's shoulders. Such, I believe, is the way the God of Abraham, Isaac, and
Jacob raises his Jewish and Christian children, the way he has
chosen to raise especially that child whose mind is Western, seeking to satiate a hunger for knowledge beyond what is given in the
Torah, and whose self-understanding is defined with reference to
the mind rather than the soul.
Reb Saunders is a Jew who "believes the soul is as important
as the mind, if not more so." He is himself a suffering servant of
his followers. "There are," after all, "Hasidic groups who believe
their leaders should take upon themselves the sufferings of the
Jewish people," for "They believe that their sufferings would be
unendurable if their leaders did not somehow absorb these sufferings into themselves." 32 Such a man was Reb Saunders. And
Daniel? What was his promise as a child?
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Reuven, the Master of the Universe blessed me with a brilliant son. And
he cursed me with all the problems of raising him. Ah, what it is to have
a brilliant son! Not a smart son, Reuven, but a brilliant son, a Daniel, a
boy with a mind like a jewel. Ah, what a curse it is, what an anguish it is
to have a Daniel, whose mind is like a pearl, like a sun...[My] four-year old
Daniel...was a mind in a body without a soul...I...cried to the Master of the
Universe, 'What have you done to me? A mind like this I need for a son?
A heart I need for a son, a soul I need for a son, compassion I want from
my son, righteousness, mercy, strength to suffer and carry pain, that I want
from my son, not a mind without a soul!" 3

God raises humanity in silence. He teaches Western humanity in silence, so that we may walk around inside ourselves in company with our souls. "One learns of the pain of others," says Reb
Saunders, "by suffering one's own pain...by turning inside oneself, by finding one's own soul. And it is important to know of
pain...It destroys our self-pride, our arrogance, our indifference
toward others. It makes us aware of how frail and tiny we are and
of how much we must depend on the Master of the Universe." 34
Like Daniel Saunders we are now old enough to understand
G o d ' s silence. After years, after centuries, of being both "bewildered" and "frightened" by that inviolate silence, we can understand:
of all people a tzaddik especially must know of pain. A tzaddik must know
how to suffer for his people...He must take their pain from them and carry
it on his own shoulders. He must carry it always. He must grow old before
his years. He must cry, in his heart he must always cry. Even when he
dances and sings, he must cry for the sufferings of his people."

Such is the desire of the silent and hidden God — that he
raise a child to be a tzaddik, a child having such depth of soul that
the soul will dominate the shell, so that the human mind in all its
genius cannot choke the spark of goodness. Western humanity,
like Daniel, must come to the point of understanding what Reb
Saunders understands, for one who takes of the tree of knowledge
of good and evil cannot take of the tree of life otherwise:
Better I should have had no son at all than to have a brilliant son who had
no soul. 1 looked at my Daniel when he was four years old, and 1 said to
myself. How will I teach this mind what it is to have a soul? How will 1
teach this mind to understand pain? How will I teach it to want to take on
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another person's suffering? How will I do this and not lose my son...How
will I do this and not cause my son, God forbid, to abandon the Master of
the Universe and his Commandments?...I did not want to drive my son
away from God, but I did not want him to grow up a mind without a
soul...Ah, what it is to be a mind without a soul, what ugliness it is....' 6

Like Daniel suffering for years his father's silence, so we
stand in our suffering before the silent God, our Father. Insofar
as we ask the questions we ask of God concerning the presence of
evil in this world, then — as in the silence between Daniel and his
father — then in the silence between us and God we begin to hear
the world crying. To hear silence thus, to hear this silence, is to
experience the positive dimension of God's silence, different as it
is from the negative silence of God, i.e., that of reproof or anger
in the face of the human transgression of a covenant relationship.
To understand God's silence as positive is to understand what is
spoken in 1 Kings 19:2, i.e., "the authentic revelatory voice of the
true God is to be found in kol damamah dakkah, the 'thin voice
of silence'." 37
Thus, the material fact of suffering is not the end of the matter. In the end suffering yields a tzaddik, and only one whose
character/soul is so formed can rightfully be entrusted with the
work of eternity, that work which begins as the millenial work of
one who is king (thus hasid) and also priest (thus tzaddik ) [Ex.
19:6 and Rev. 1:6], God speaks the first (A) and the last word (Q),
in between maintaining his silence. Yet, God breaks that silence
as God himself suffers, and so discloses thereby the essence of the
human imitatio Dei, i.e., the suffering servant. To wait on God is
to await the Q, that last word which is the promise of a God who
will yet speak to his chosen from out of the fullness of his silence.
Just as between election and redemption there is suffering, so
between the A and the Q there is silence. But, silence and
absence have the promise of the full measure of God's presence,
for it is in attaining to the righteousness (tzedakah) of the tzaddik
that one sees the face of God (Ps. 17:15).
So, if Western humanity can live now beyond hatred and
rebellion, beyond vengeance and sustained ressentiment, tossing
aside its life-enhancing fictions, then Western humanity can live
in this present world in that depth of soul which waits for God,
waits on the Messiah. 38 For then we understand that "the world
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needs a tzaddik," now, especially now, and each of us must be a
tzaddik for the world, contributing thereby to tikkun ha'olom, to
the mending of the world. 39 Each of us must be a soul and not just
a mind; a heart and not just a mind; each of us having that
strength of soul which not only can suffer and carry pain, but
which wants to take on another's suffering. Knowledge and
grace, justice and mercy — this is what must become character in
the human being, even as God is both hasid and tzaddik:*' To say
that God is both hasid and tzaddik is to understand that God created the world in justice and in mercy: "...said the Holy One,
blessed be He, 'If I create the world only with the attribute of
mercy, sins will multiply beyond all bounds; if I create it only
with the attribute of justice, how can the world last? Behold, I
will create it with both attributes; would that it might e n d u r e ! ' "
(Gen. R. XII, 15) 4 ' Thus, the human being was "formed in great
weakness," but so formed that this one being may be "a cup to
hold G o d ' s grace." 42
Even Nietzsche, despite his critique of the "Christian" practice and dogma of his day, held out such a possibility insofar as he
gave due respect to the depth of the soul that was to be found in
the Jew, thus giving due place to the "discipline" of great suffering. This holds true even and especially after Auschwitz; for, as
Joshua O. Haberman remarked, "The Holocaust experience reinforces the realization that Israel cannot stand alone in its devotion
to Torah. The innocent cannot survive in a world of wickedness.
Righteousness must be universalized." 4 3 G o d ' s creation is "very
g o o d " — only "good" in the absence of the human creature, "very
good" with the human included — but it is not created holy
(kodesh). The human being is not created holy, though the human
being can become holy. It is the will of God that every human
being make the transition "beyond good and evil" to the holy. It
is never sufficient for life, for eternal life, to know the good and
the evil; it is necessary that one be holy. Holiness is beyond good
and evil.
Thus, even in the face of Auschwitz, and especially as one
confronts the silence of God in the experience of Auschwitz, one
must beware "the demonic voice" that speaks in that silence of the
death of the God of Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob: "Israel's faith has
always centered about the saving acts of God: the election, the
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Exodus, the Temple and the Messiah...The God of Israel is a
redeeming God...There is no salvation to be extracted from the
Holocaust...If there is hope after the Holocaust, it is because to
those who believe, the voices of the Prophets speak more loudly
than did Hitler, and because the divine promise sweeps over the
crematoria and silences the voice of Auschwitz," i.e., that demonic voice which speaks to have us defy and/or deny the transcendent God. 44
Silence... "It is, perhaps, the only way to raise a tzaddik"** —
the only way, perhaps, even for God.
V
It has been argued (and argued, I think, in a compelling way)
by D.A. Conway that talk of "versions" of the problem of evil is
spurious, i.e., the tendency to distinguish between a "logical
(deductive)" and an "evidential" version. 46 There is a problem of
evil, however, says Conway, and it is a philosophical rather than
a mathematical or scientific problem. Conway states the essence
of the problem of evil in noting that "the theological problem arises because there exist evils that it appears a being of a certain specific ability could prevent without thereby preventing the occurrence of an equal or greater good." 47 At issue here is not the presence of any evil whatever or some quantity of evil, but superfluous, unnecessary, or "omni-preventable" evil, i.e., evil which an
omniscient, omnipotent, and omnibenevolent being "can prevent
without thereby preventing the occurrence of an equal or greater
good." The claim here is that the existence of God and the existence of omni-preventable evil is a contradiction. A God such as
is conceived by the theism of Judaism and Christianity is expected to create "the best possible world." 48 Yet, as Conway put it, "If
there were reason to believe that all of the evils in this world are
necessary parts of the best of all possible worlds, then no evil
would count at all against the existence of God." It appears to us
there is no reason to believe that all of the evils in this world are
necessary parts of the best of all possible worlds. In the absence
of such reason, God cannot but be considered unjust or malevolent — if, indeed, he exists and is omnipotent.
The central consideration in the foregoing, it seems to me, is
twofold in issue: (a) whether one is correct in expecting God to
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have created the best of all possible worlds, and (b) whether one
understands G o d ' s creative act itself rightly. In both issues there
is operative an assumption of what I call the cognitive
sufficiency
of the human understanding in the very moment that it takes up
the problem of evil both to consider it and to resolve it. Yet, as
Garth Hallet rightly points out, "the problem of evil is as much a
problem about our understanding as it is about evil"; and surely
the human being "is not in a position to estimate the extent of its
non-understanding." 4 9 The simple fact of the matter is that we
sometimes need to be reminded of our fallibility, especially so
whenever we think ourselves to be in that "epistemic condition"
which ostensibly understands the ways of God. Precisely here the
Western mind manifests its hubris; for the transcendent God has
his prophet Isaiah (55:9) say: "As the heavens are higher than the
earth, so are my ways higher than your ways and my thoughts
[higher] than your thoughts"; and, indeed, not only are G o d ' s
ways and thoughts "higher," but (as v. 8 puts it) G o d ' s thoughts
are not human thoughts nor his ways human ways. Reasoning
from analogy — as we do about the problem of evil on the expectation that God thinks and acts as we do and as we would — is
already problematic. Thus, the choice of word is all the more significant concerning that which is called omni-preventable evil: it
appears to us that there is no reason to believe that all of the evils
in this world are necessary parts of the best of all possible worlds.
Yet, surely one can answer here — and answer reasonably — that
the question is undecidable precisely in view of our cognitive
insufficiency. To speak of omni-preventable evil, it seems to me,
"betray[s] unfounded confidence in [our] cognitive condition" (to
use Hallet's words here).
T h e foregoing point can be gainfully supplemented also by
considering that the question about omni-preventable evil is
semantically a why-question — in our case, viz., "why does God
permit the Nazi genocide (Holocaust) of the J e w s ? " We presume
to comprehend the logic of the question without accounting for
the fact that the question is often asked both with a "normal intonation contour" and with an "emphatic stress" that has varying
implicatures. One may thereby ask: To which question do we
seek an answer? Here I comment in parallel to the discussion of
the semantics of why-questions undertaken by Bas van Fraasen
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and Sylvain Bromberger. 50 The question, "Why does God permit
the Nazi genocide (Holocaust) of the Jews?" can be uttered with
normal intonation contour as well as with emphatic stress, thus:
(a) Why does God permit the Nazi genocide (Holocaust) of
the Jews?
(b) Why does G O D permit the Nazi genocide (Holocaust) of
the Jews?
(c) Why does God PERMIT the Nazi genocide (Holocaust) of
the Jews?
(d) Why does God permit the NAZI GENOCIDE (HOLOCAUST) of the Jews?
(e) Why does God permit the Nazi genocide (Holocaust) of
the JEWS?
Questions (b) through (e) have "different implicatures."
Question (b) implicates that some being other than God (e.g., the
Satan) might have permitted such evil but God could not, would
not, and should not do so. Question (c) implicates that God might
have acted in some way other than to permit such evil but did not
(e.g., he might have forbade it). Question (d) implicates that God
might have permitted an evil different from Nazi genocide (e.g.,
he might have permitted an evil in quantity and quality less than
genocide). Question (e) implicates that God might have permitted such an evil for a people other than his chosen Jews (e.g., he
might have chosen Muslims then in Europe). The point here
(again, following van Fraassen and Bromberger) is twofold: (1)
Questions (b) through (e) do not "express different ways of construing" Question (a); (2) "different placement of emphatic stress
imposes different conditions on what counts as an answer." Each
of the why-questions has presuppositions, "prepositional presuppositions"; and to know that any one of these Questions (a)
through (e) is sound we must somehow "know that its prepositional presupposition is true." More important, we are in the situation of "not knowing what [we ] must find out in order to know
whether there is anything to know at all!"5' And here is the burden of our ignorance before the question, "Why does God permit
the Nazi genocide (Holocaust) of the Jews?" We do not know the
conditions under which an answer to the question is true even had
we an answer.
With this now in mind, we can reflect upon the discussion of
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Sections I through IV above. The interpretation that I have
advanced through Section IV allows for both a meaningful and a
plausible theistic response to the skeptic. It is a response articulated, for the most part, as an intuitive thinking, speaking an edif y i n g rather than a d e m o n s t r a b l y propositional discourse.
Consistent with the Hasidic comportment, it offers "provocative
hints" — sometimes only intuitions afford the requisite access to
the unresolved questions of human existence.
The interpretation given here understands G o d ' s creation as
allowing for the presence of evil even at "the beginning," i.e., in
the distinction of "good," "very good," and "holy," G o d ' s creation
being "actually" good and even "actually" very good, but only
"potentially" holy. The foregoing interpretation also understands
suffering as something essentially good for the human being insofar as the goal is one of formation of soul/character, which, in the
case of a being with free will, requires time. The interpretation
given here, then, is that God has a good reason for permitting evil
and human suffering. One can say this not deductively, not inductively, but only tentatively and defeasibly, even reluctantly. One
cannot say this without shuddering in the very moment of its
utterance. Yet, in that shudder one acknowledges, concedes, to
God the mystery of his ways. Therein is a piety that makes no
room for the hubris of a merely human cognitive potency, for a
merely human epistemic confidence. Here is fear and trembling,
indeed, for here the individual soul is at risk: S/he may transmute
the shudder into a violent, discordant and defiant rage or settle it
in the preserve of silence. The former accuses from the distance
of sustained agony; the latter, abandoning the vengeance of its
interrogation, takes hold of the possibility of devequt
("intimate
attachment to God") and moves devotionally from qatnut to gadlutThere,
even in the midst of Auschwitz, an "empty vessel"
— empty of distinctions such as life and death — may "receive
the light from above," and thus become testament to the reality of
hiyyut, the reality of the divine life.
Yes, one shudders. The thought that God has a good reason
for permitting evil and human suffering is at once estranging and
beckoning — and here is the first distinction to be overcome in
the ascent to gadlut.
Auschwitz has its walls, like a monolithic
labyrinth separating the human from the divine, and so hiding
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God all the more. Yet, it takes but a single word of prayer to topple all these walls and to disclose the otherwise hidden God."
Estranged from the material world, those in the death camps had
the unique opportunity — one shudders — to overcome the spiritual estrangement which those steeped in the material world suffer all too unwittingly. Auschwitz cannot be the name of a "gratuitously inflationary" example of death as it bears upon the problem of evil. The good from this suffering (we dare not say 'good'
yet dare to say it) is disclosed perhaps, as the Hasidic Rabbi
Nachman of Bratslav might say, in the fact that "In working with
people to bring them to themselves, one must work at great depth,
a depth scarcely imaginable." All too starkly, "Auschwitz" sets
the body aflame; but the Jew who had erstwhile prayed had long
before set his/her heart aflame. And though the smoke from the
ovens at "Auschwitz" rose into the expanse of sky, yet a purer
smoke had long before ascended in the word of faith: It was "not
the words themselves that ascend[ed]," but rather "the burning
desire" of the human heart that rose like smoke toward heaven. 54
Here in the devotional ascent to gadlut, the human heart manifests
its kavannah, an "intentionality" which is at once outward in
attending to the cry of the world and upward in attending to "the
transcendent aspects of existence." 55 Here is the true evidence of
shoah.
In the Nazi genocide we are able to see clearly the singularity that belongs to each individual's death. "Auschwitz" qua the
technological rationality that issues in mass death, is not distinguished by this mass phenomenon. It is rather distinguished by
the singularity of death which such technological rationality
would otherwise cover over. We look upon Auschwitz as an
event, as something we can explain. Ultimately it is inexplicable.
Our modern objectivist "knowing" frame of mind arrogates to
itself an epistemic confidence to "give account." Yet, precisely in
clarifying the singularity of death, Auschwitz halts this epistemic
move. Here indeed, for this reason especially, it cannot be said
that the use of Auschwitz is a gratuitously inflationary example of
the problem of evil. 'Death' here is surely understood in its biological signification. But it is a mistake a priori and a posteriori
to exclude other significations. The biological signification
speaks of 'end,' 'completion,' an entity in its "totality," and so we
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can and do speak of our experiencing the death of others. In the
"respectful solicitude" of our mourning and commemoration, we
acknowledge a loss, an absence. It behooves us to consider:
"Death does indeed reveal itself as a loss, but a loss such as is
experienced by those who remain. In suffering this loss, however, we have no way of access to the loss-of-being as such which
the dying man ' s u f f e r s ' . The dying of Others is not something we
experience in a genuine sense; at most we are always just 'there
alongside'." 5 6 And yet, this phenomenological description falls
short. The death of a single individual all too often invites explanation, a rational account, and it is readily given. But the countless deaths of a chosen people — this "event" permits no rational
accounting, no calculative thinking, no measure of gain or loss.
Thinking is halted. Mass death calls for silence. And in that
silence, in this moment of being dumbfounded, those who yield
their lives are emptied of all self-assertion, emptied for "the thin
voice"of the God who then speaks in that silence. To be emptied,
as the hasid knows, is to become attuned to that voice. Only the
Jew, chosen according to transcendent purpose precisely because
of his/her depth of soul, could endure such suffering.
It is of capital significance that so many of the victims of the
Nazi genocide were from Eastern European Jewry. Here was the
home of Hasidism, of the hasid who was taught to internalize the
spiritual teaching of the Baal Shem Tov (the Besht) and the Rabbi
Elimelekh. "Sadness and self-pity," the Besht taught, "distance
us from the Holy Source." "...[You] ought to intend," taught
Rabbi Elimelekh, "that if all the nations of the world would inflict
the greatest pains on you and skin you alive in order to bring
about your denial of His Blessed Unity, you would much rather
suffer all these pains than, God forbid, acceed to them." 57 Here
was the hasid who, foreswearing sadness and self-pity, intending
the greatest pains if need be, had his/her faith put to the gravest
challenge; for, in the death camps the spiritual task was not merely to transform the mundane into the sacred but, indeed, to
achieve that transformation in the midst of a profane existence. In
dying the hasid had to bear witness to the divine power to transform even the profane. His and her's is a redemptive act, for we
who remain stand to be uplifted in this life even as he and she
have been uplifted in death. Though we, who remain, shudder as
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we come face to face with the manner in which they gave their
lives, yet we dare not therefore deprecate their sanctification of
the Name. The hasid knew that s/he had "to be 'constant holocausts' before God in order to gain merit for their fellow Jews."
They gave in the full measure of devotion that we might be uplifted, and in so yielding their lives, they show themselves to be the
most "pious" souls indeed. God has a great longing for the tzaddik, taught Rabbi Nachman of Bratslav, just as the tzaddik yearns
to return and come close to God. If we who remain — and who
remain in the dumbfounded silence of attunement (devequt)
—
listen to the "thin voice of silence" that speaks from the death
camps, then ours can be a "cry of gratitude": They are the vehicle
of our return. True to the Hasidic devotional quest, those who
died at "Auschwitz" disclose in that act their true legacy — "there
is no higher act than that of helping another to discover the presence of God within his or her own soul." 58 Theirs has been a mortal sacrifice; ours must be a living sacrifice. Our task is to move
beyond the shudder of that encounter, beyond our empathy with
the supplicants of the death camps, to "recover from our identification" with them, and to disclose (albeit intuitively) and transmit
the pertinent insights. Only then will their redemptive act have
potency for us who yet live by the grace of God to take instruction.
And what of the children who died in the death camps? They,
too, are part of the evil that is necessary? Here especially one
shudders and closes one's eyes, for here the "good" attaches not
to the child's soul which in its ignorance and innocence fathoms
not the chaos into which it is immersed. No, here the good attaches to an admonitory revelation for us the living: The technological rationality of Western political modernity is Janus-faced, one
face of which is the ancient god Molech to whom children are
sacrificed in the fire. It is to the shame of Western modernity that
this evil has been necessary to penetrate and reprove our stonehearted sensibility. Precisely here, we the living are called to lay
claim to Torah, and even to universalize the righteousness of
YHWH Elohim over against the modern insurrections of Molech.
Today, unavoidably, we are immersed in a quarrel between
Athens and Jerusalem, torn between the dispensations of reason
and the dispensations of faith. We dare not again ignore the
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admonition and yet current plea of the prophet Samuel (1 Sam.
8:1 ff.) against choosing a human king and to acknowledge
YHWH Elohim alone as melek ha olam va ha aretz.
VI
To conclude, then: The existence of God and the existence of
evil — even so called omni-preventable evil — are consistent.
That is, on the view given here one does not want to assert that
the existence of God and the presence of evil are "explicitly contradictory." It is not "necessarily true" or even "contingently
true" that "an omnipotent, omniscient, and perfectly good being
will prevent the occurrence of any evil whatever." 59
The absence of evil would depend on a creation sine malum;
our reasoning being that the best of all possible worlds is a world
in which there is no evil whatever. But, God has not chosen to
create thus. His is not a "holy" (kodesh) creation. The "beginning" is not a beginning sine malum. The creation at this beginning is already "subject to corruption" — not by God, but by the
agency of "spiritual forces of evil in the heavenly realms" (Eph.
6:12); i.e., the "evil" that is intrinsic to the Satan as a being with
free will, as a being who is himself through that agency the efficient cause of universal corruption. God does charge angels with
error (Job 4:18). At that "beginning" of which the scriptural
record speaks, G o d ' s creation is a re-creation, a renewal
(Ps.
104:30); the creation had become
tohu and bohu, had become
"formless" and "empty," in the "war in heaven" that followed the
rebellion of the angels. In this sense, then, there may be something pertinent to Plantinga's view that "it is possible that the best
world available to God to create was a world with free creatures
and evil." 6 " But, even here one needs to be careful of a tacit
assumption, viz., that G o d ' s creative act is completed and that we
are the sorry participants of a failed creative act.
According to the interpretation I have advanced here, what is
essential in the raising of a human being is formation of soul/character and not only or even primarily presence of mind/intellect.
The human creature is a mortal living being, created "a little
lower" than the angels, all of whom are immortal creatures. It is
in the power of God to create both mortal and immortal beings.
But, the mere presence of the attribute of immortality does not
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ensure the presence of righteousness, indeed the presence of
righteousness such as God has. The Satan, as the fallen Lucifer,
is evidence of that fact (insofar as one accepts the testimony of the
scriptural record). The attribute of righteousness is formed; it is
a forming of the soul in its fullness. In the case of the human
being it is the forming of his/her soul. God's work, in short, is
ongoing — it did not "end" in his "Sabbath rest." The human
being has knowledge of the good and the evil, even as does God;
but, the human being lacks the unfailing discernment between the
good and the evil, such as God has. Formation of the human soul
is in the service of that unfailing discernment. Only that which
has such discernment chooses the good and, thus, is itself holy.
Holiness of the human being, participation in the divine nature,
such is the goal according to which there is the formation of the
human soul in suffering. The human being is being formed not
just for immortality, but for immortality and holiness. It is
through the latter that the human being can be made higher than
the angelic host. God's silence is not without good reason. Thus,
like Elie Wiesel who gives expression to the unique suffering
experienced at Auschwitz, we can say, and believe: Ani maamin
beviat ha-Mashiach — I believe in the coming of the Messiah.
University of Alaska,

Fairbanks
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